of the structure of the universe

   1) The Book of Nature Is Written in the Language of Mathematics

   Philosophy is written in that great book, the universe, which is always open, right before our eyes. But one cannot understand this book without first learning to understand the language and to know the characters in which it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and the characters are triangles, circles, and other figures. Without these, one cannot understand a single word of it, and just wanders in a dark labyrinth. (Galileo, 1990, p. 232)

   2) Arranging Speech so as to Reply Appropriately

   It never happens that it [a nonhuman animal] arranges its speech in various ways in order to reply appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as even the lowest type of man can do. (Descartes, 1970a, p. 116)

   3) No Other Animal Has the Language Capacity of the Human

   It is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting idiots, that they cannot arrange different words together, forming of them a statement by which they make known their thoughts; while, on the other hand, there is no other animal, however perfect and fortunately circumstanced it may be, which can do the same. (Descartes, 1967, p. 116)

   4) Human Beings Do Not Live Only in the World of Objects

   Human beings do not live in the object world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built on the language habits of the group.... We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation. (Sapir, 1921, p. 75)

   5) Language Powerfully Conditions All Our Thinking

   It powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes.... No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same worlds with different labels attached. (Sapir, 1985, p. 162)

   6) A List of Language Games

   [A list of language games, not meant to be exhaustive:]

   Giving orders, and obeying them- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)Reporting an eventSpeculating about an eventForming and testing a hypothesisPresenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagramsMaking up a story; and reading itPlay actingSinging catchesGuessing riddlesMaking a joke; and telling it

   Solving a problem in practical arithmeticTranslating from one language into another

   LANGUAGE Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, and praying-. (Wittgenstein, 1953, Pt. I, No. 23, pp. 11 e-12 e)

   7) Language Constrains Certain Modes of Interpretation

   We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages.... The world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... No individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 153, 213-214)

   8) We Dissect Nature in Accordance with Our Native Languages

   We dissect nature along the lines laid down by our native languages.

   The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar or can in some way be calibrated. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 213-214)

   9) The Forms of a Person's Thoughts Are Controlled by Unperceived Patterns of His Own Language

   The forms of a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language-shown readily enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages, especially those of a different linguistic family. (Whorf, 1956, p. 252)

    10) The Analysis of Certain Types of Utterances

   It has come to be commonly held that many utterances which look like statements are either not intended at all, or only intended in part, to record or impart straightforward information about the facts.... Many traditional philosophical perplexities have arisen through a mistake-the mistake of taking as straightforward statements of fact utterances which are either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) nonsensical or else intended as something quite different. (Austin, 1962, pp. 2-3)

    11) The Dictionary of a Language Is a System of Concepts

   In general, one might define a complex of semantic components connected by logical constants as a concept. The dictionary of a language is then a system of concepts in which a phonological form and certain syntactic and morphological characteristics are assigned to each concept. This system of concepts is structured by several types of relations. It is supplemented, furthermore, by redundancy or implicational rules..., representing general properties of the whole system of concepts.... At least a relevant part of these general rules is not bound to particular languages, but represents presumably universal structures of natural languages. They are not learned, but are rather a part of the human ability to acquire an arbitrary natural language. (Bierwisch, 1970, pp. 171-172)

    12) Talk about the Evolution of the Language Capacity is Beside the Point

   In studying the evolution of mind, we cannot guess to what extent there are physically possible alternatives to, say, transformational generative grammar, for an organism meeting certain other physical conditions characteristic of humans. Conceivably, there are none-or very few-in which case talk about evolution of the language capacity is beside the point. (Chomsky, 1972, p. 98)

    13) The Development of Language

   [It is] truth value rather than syntactic well-formedness that chiefly governs explicit verbal reinforcement by parents-which renders mildly paradoxical the fact that the usual product of such a training schedule is an adult whose speech is highly grammatical but not notably truthful. (R. O. Brown, 1973, p. 330)

    14) Sentential and Conceptual Levels in Language

   he conceptual base is responsible for formally representing the concepts underlying an utterance.... A given word in a language may or may not have one or more concepts underlying it.... On the sentential level, the utterances of a given language are encoded within a syntactic structure of that language. The basic construction of the sentential level is the sentence.

   The next highest level... is the conceptual level. We call the basic construction of this level the conceptualization. A conceptualization consists of concepts and certain relations among those concepts. We can consider that both levels exist at the same point in time and that for any unit on one level, some corresponding realizate exists on the other level. This realizate may be null or extremely complex.... Conceptualizations may relate to other conceptualizations by nesting or other specified relationships. (Schank, 1973, pp. 191-192)

    15) Linguistic Realities Have Not Yet Been Captured by Theoretical Models

   The mathematics of multi-dimensional interactive spaces and lattices, the projection of "computer behavior" on to possible models of cerebral functions, the theoretical and mechanical investigation of artificial intelligence, are producing a stream of sophisticated, often suggestive ideas.

   But it is, I believe, fair to say that nothing put forward until now in either theoretic design or mechanical mimicry comes even remotely in reach of the most rudimentary linguistic realities. (Steiner, 1975, p. 284)

    16) The Final Steps to Human Language

   The step from the simple tool to the master tool, a tool to make tools (what we would now call a machine tool), seems to me indeed to parallel the final step to human language, which I call reconstitution. It expresses in a practical and social context the same understanding of hierarchy, and shows the same analysis by function as a basis for synthesis. (Bronowski, 1977, pp. 127-128)

    17) The Inadequacy of Formal Linguistic Models for Ordinary Language Usage

    t is the language donn eґ in which we conduct our lives.... We have no other. And the danger is that formal linguistic models, in their loosely argued analogy with the axiomatic structure of the mathematical sciences, may block perception.... It is quite conceivable that, in language, continuous induction from simple, elemental units to more complex, realistic forms is not justified. The extent and formal "undecidability" of context-and every linguistic particle above the level of the phoneme is context-bound-may make it impossible, except in the most abstract, meta-linguistic sense, to pass from "pro-verbs," "kernals," or "deep deep structures" to actual speech. (Steiner, 1975, pp. 111-113)

    18) When a Language Is an Abstract Machine

   A higher-level formal language is an abstract machine. (Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 113)

    19) Metaphor and Metonymy Underpin the Formation of Linguistic Signs

   Jakobson sees metaphor and metonymy as the characteristic modes of binarily opposed polarities which between them underpin the two-fold process of selection and combination by which linguistic signs are formed.... Thus messages are constructed, as Saussure said, by a combination of a "horizontal" movement, which combines words together, and a "vertical" movement, which selects the particular words from the available inventory or "inner storehouse" of the language. The combinative (or syntagmatic) process manifests itself in contiguity (one word being placed next to another) and its mode is metonymic. The selective (or associative) process manifests itself in similarity (one word or concept being "like" another) and its mode is metaphoric. The "opposition" of metaphor and metonymy therefore may be said to represent in effect the essence of the total opposition between the synchronic mode of language (its immediate, coexistent, "vertical" relationships) and its diachronic mode (its sequential, successive, lineal progressive relationships). (Hawkes, 1977, pp. 77-78)

    20) Language and the Analysis of Nature

   It is striking that the layered structure that man has given to language constantly reappears in his analyses of nature. (Bronowski, 1977, p. 121)

    21) Correspondence Rules for Mapping Old Theory into Subsets of New Theory

   First, [an ideal intertheoretic reduction] provides us with a set of rules"correspondence rules" or "bridge laws," as the standard vernacular has it-which effect a mapping of the terms of the old theory (T o) onto a subset of the expressions of the new or reducing theory (T n). These rules guide the application of those selected expressions of T n in the following way: we are free to make singular applications of their correspondencerule doppelgangers in T o....

   Second, and equally important, a successful reduction ideally has the outcome that, under the term mapping effected by the correspondence rules, the central principles of T o (those of semantic and systematic importance) are mapped onto general sentences of T n that are theorems of Tn. (P. Churchland, 1979, p. 81)

    22) The Inclusion of Non- linguistic Factors in a Theory of Grammar

   If non-linguistic factors must be included in grammar: beliefs, attitudes, etc. [this would] amount to a rejection of the initial idealization of language as an object of study. A priori such a move cannot be ruled out, but it must be empirically motivated. If it proves to be correct, I would conclude that language is a chaos that is not worth studying.... Note that the question is not whether beliefs or attitudes, and so on, play a role in linguistic behavior and linguistic judgments... [but rather] whether distinct cognitive structures can be identified, which interact in the real use of language and linguistic judgments, the grammatical system being one of these. (Chomsky, 1979, pp. 140, 152-153)

    23) Language Is Inevitably Influenced by Specific Contexts of Human Interaction

   Language cannot be studied in isolation from the investigation of "rationality." It cannot afford to neglect our everyday assumptions concerning the total behavior of a reasonable person.... An integrational linguistics must recognize that human beings inhabit a communicational space which is not neatly compartmentalized into language and nonlanguage.... It renounces in advance the possibility of setting up systems of forms and meanings which will "account for" a central core of linguistic behavior irrespective of the situation and communicational purposes involved. (Harris, 1981, p. 165)

    24) The Genetic Blueprints of Language

   By innate [linguistic knowledge], Chomsky simply means "genetically programmed." He does not literally think that children are born with language in their heads ready to be spoken. He merely claims that a "blueprint is there, which is brought into use when the child reaches a certain point in her general development. With the help of this blueprint, she analyzes the language she hears around her more readily than she would if she were totally unprepared for the strange gabbling sounds which emerge from human mouths. (Aitchison, 1987, p. 31)

    25) Languages Are Machines

   Looking at ourselves from the computer viewpoint, we cannot avoid seeing that natural language is our most important "programming language." This means that a vast portion of our knowledge and activity is, for us, best communicated and understood in our natural language.... One could say that natural language was our first great original artifact and, since, as we increasingly realize, languages are machines, so natural language, with our brains to run it, was our primal invention of the universal computer. One could say this except for the sneaking suspicion that language isn't something we invented but something we became, not something we constructed but something in which we created, and recreated, ourselves. (Leiber, 1991, p. 8)

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- studiować architekturę to study architecture

- architektura gotycka/baroku Gothic/baroque architecture

- dom o prostej architekturze a house of plain architectural style

- architektura powieści the structure of a novel

- architektura współczesnych komputerów the design of modern computers

- architektura wszechświata the structure a. architecture of the universe

- □ architektura krajobrazu Ogr. landscape architecture

- architektura wnętrz interior design a. decoration

- mała architektura architectural details a. ornament; (ogrodu) architectural features

ὑπόστασις, εως, ἡ (ὑφίστημι; Hippocr.+; Polyb. 4, 50, 10; 6, 55, 2; Diod S 16, 32, 3; 16, 33, 1; M. Ant. 10, 5; ins, pap, LXX; PsSol 15:5; 17:24; TestReub 2:7; TestZeb 2:4; Tat.; Ath. 21, 3; Iren. 5, 36, 1 [Harv. II 426, 1]; Hippol., Ref. 10, 17, 2; Did., Gen. 128, 11 in widely different meanings. See Dörrie 4 below.)

① the essential or basic structure/nature of an entity, substantial nature, essence, actual being, reality (underlying structure, oft. in contrast to what merely seems to be: Ps.-Aristot., De Mundo 4 p. 395a, 29f; Plut., Mor. 894b; Diog. L., Pyrrh. 9, 91; Artem. 3, 14; Ps 38:6; Wsd 16:21; TestReub 2:7; SJCh 78, 30; Philo, Aet. M. 88; 92; Jos., C. Ap. 1, 1; Tat. 6, 2; Ath. 21, 3; cp. the answer of a certain Secundus, who, when asked ‘Quid fides?’, answered: ‘ignotae rei mira certitudo’=a marvelous certainty about someth. otherwise unknown [FPhGr I 516]; s. also Lexicon Sabbaiticum: Lexica Graeca Minora ’65, 53)

ⓐ of the Son of God as χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ a(n) exact representation of (God’s) real being (i.e. as one who is in charge of the universe) Hb 1:3. Sim. of polytheists’ deities, whose basic reality is someth. material like stone, metal etc. Dg 2:1.

ⓑ of things: among the meanings that can be authenticated for Hb 11:1 a strong claim can be made for realization (Diod S 1, 3, 2 of the realization of a plan; Cornutus 9 p. 9, 3 of the realization of humanity; Jos., C. Ap. 1, 1 that of the Jewish people, both by a divine act; Tat. 5, 1 of God τοῦ παντὸς ἡ ὑπόστασις): ἔστιν πίστις ἐλπιζομένων ὑπ.=in faith things hoped for become realized, or things hoped for take on (but s. 3 and 4 below) reality. Conversely, ‘without faith things hoped for would have no reality’. HKöster (s. bibliog. 4 below) argues for this sense also in 3:14, but s. 2. Cp. the rendering ‘substance’ (e.g. KJV, REB).

② a plan that one devises for action, plan, project, undertaking, endeavor (Diod. Sic 15, 70, 2; 16, 32, 3; 16, 82, 6; 17, 69, 7; Ezk 19:5) ἐν τῇ ὑποστάσει ταύτῃ in connection with this undertaking i.e. the collection for Jerusalem 2 Cor 9:4. The fact that meeting a financial obligation is the main theme (vss. 1–2) might well suggest association of ὑπ. with its use e.g. as a t.t. of expectation of rent due PTebt 61b, 194. To emphasize the importance of steadfast commitment to professed obligation (opp. καρδία πονηρὰ ἀπιστίας ἐν τῷ ἀποστῆναι), the author of Hb 3:14 uses ὑπ. in a way that invites an addressee to draw on the semantic component of obligation familiar in commercial usage of the term (s. PTebt above), an association that is invited by use of μέτοχος, a standard term for a business partner (PHib 109, 3; PCairZen 176, 102 [both III B.C.]), μέχρι τέλους (s.v. τέλος 2bβ), and βέβαιος (s. M-M s.v.). S. Köster 1b above for focus of ὑπ. on ‘reality’.—Satirically, ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ὑποστάσει τῆς καυχήσεως in this boasting project of mine 2 Cor 11:17.

③ The interp. situation, condition (Cicero, Ad Attic. 2, 3, 3 ὑπόστασιν nostram=our situation), also specif. frame of mind (Dio Cass. 49, 9; Themist., Or. 13 p. 178b; Jos., Ant. 18, 24 of determination in desperate circumstances; sim. Polyb. 6, 55, 2) has been suggested for some of the passages cited in 1 and 2 above: 2 Cor 9:4 (explained in a v.l. via the epexegetical gen. καυχήσεως); 11:17; Hb 3:14 (s. Dörrie [bibliog. 4 below], p. 39: the frame of mind described in Hb 3:6). The sense ‘confidence’, ‘assurance’ (based on LXX [Ruth 1:12; Ps 38:8; Ezk 19:5], where it renders תִּקְוָה etc.) favored by Melanchthon and Luther (also Tyndale, NRSV, but not KJV) for Hb 11:1 has enjoyed much favor but must be eliminated, since examples of it cannot be found (s. Dörrie and Köster [4 below]). More prob. for Hb 4:11 is

④ guarantee of ownership/entitlement, title deed (Sb 9086 III, 1–11 [104 A.D.]; Spicq III 423 n. 14; cp. M-M s.v.) Hb 11:1 (cp. 2 above for commercial use of ὕπ.).—ASchlatter, Der Glaube im NT⁴ 1927, 614ff; MMathis, The Pauline πίστισ-ὑπόστασις acc. to Hb 11:1, diss. Cath. Univ. of Amer., Washington, D.C. 1920, also Biblica 3, 1922, 79–87; RWitt, Hypostasis: ‘Amicitiae Corolla’ (RHarris Festschr.) ’33, 319–43; MSchumpp, D. Glaubensbegriff des Hb: Divus Thomas 11, ’34, 397–410; FErdin, D. Wort Hypostasis, diss. Freiburg ’39; CArpe, Philologus 94, ’41, 65–78; HDörrie, Ὑπόστασις, Wort-u. Bedeutungsgeschichte: NAWG 1955, no. 3, ZNW 46, ’55, 196–202; HKöster, TW VIII 571–88 (Köster prefers plan, project [Vorhaben] for the passages in 2 Cor, and reality [Wirklichkeit] for all 3 occurrences in Hb, contrasting the reality of God with the transitory character of the visible world). S. also the lit. s.v. πίστις 2a.—DELG s.v. ἵστημι. M-M. EDNT. TW. Spicq. Sv.

σῶμα, ατος, τό (Hom.+) ‘body.’

① body of a human being or animal, body

ⓐ dead body, corpse (so always in Hom. [but s. HHerter, σῶμα bei Homer: Charites, Studien zur Altertumswissenschaft, ELanglotz Festschr., ed. KvonSchauenburg ’57, 206–17] and oft. later, e.g. Memnon: 434 Fgm. 1, 3, 3 Jac. καίειν τὸ ς.=burn the corpse; ins, pap, LXX; PsSol 2:27; TestJob 52:11; ApcMos 34 al.; Philo, Abr. 258; Jos., Bell. 6, 276, Ant. 18, 236; Ar. 4, 3; Mel., P. 28, 196) Mt 14:12 v.l.; 27:59; Mk 15:45 v.l.; Lk 17:37; Ac 9:40; GPt 2:4; pl. J 19:31. W. gen. Mt 27:58; Mk 15:43; Lk 23:52, 55; 24:3, 23; J 19:38ab, 40; 20:12; Jd 9; GPt 2:3. Pl. Mt 27:52; Hb 13:11. AcPlCor 2:27.

ⓑ the living body (Hes. et al.) of animals Js 3:3.—Mostly of human beings Mt 5:29f; 6:22f; 26:12; Mk 5:29; 14:8; Lk 11:34abc; J 2:21; Ro 1:24; 1 Cor 6:18ab; IRo 5:3. τὰ τοῦ σώματος the parts of the body 4:2. Of women αἱ ἀσθενεῖς τῷ σώματι 1 Cl 6:2; cp. Hv 3, 11, 4.—W. and in contrast to πνεῦμα (4 Macc 11:11) Ro 8:10, 13; 1 Cor 5:3; 7:34; Js 2:26. W. and in contrast to ψυχή (Pla., Gorg. 47, 493a; Diod S 34 + 35 Fgm. 2, 30; Appian, Bell. Civ. 5, 112 §467; Ael. Aristid. 45, 17f K.=8 p. 88f D.; Lucian, Imag. 23; PGM 7, 589; Wsd 1:4; 8:19f; 2 Macc 7:37; 14:38; 4 Macc 1:28; ApcEsdr 7:3 p. 32, 13 Tdf.; EpArist 139; Philo; Jos., Bell. 3, 372–78; 6, 55; Just., A I, 8, 4; D. 6, 2 al.; Tat. 13, 1; Ath. 1, 4; Did., Gen. 56, 4; Theoph. Ant. 1, 5 [p. 66, 2]) Mt 6:25ab; 10:28ab; Lk 12:4 v.l., 22f; 2 Cl 5:4 (a saying of Jesus, fr. an unknown source); 12:4; MPol 14:2; AcPl Ha 1, 4. τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα (s. the Christian POxy 1161, 6 [IV A.D.]) 1 Th 5:23. W. and in contrast to its parts (ApcSed 11:13; Mel., P. 78, 563) Ro 12:4; 1 Cor 12:12abc (Ltzm. ad loc.), 14–20 (PMich 149, 4, 26 [II A.D.] ἧπαρ … ὅλον τὸ σῶμα); Js 3:6; 1 Cl 37:5abcd. The body as the seat of sexual function Ro 4:19; 1 Cor 7:4ab (rights over the σῶμα of one’s spouse as Artem. 1, 44 p. 42, 14f; Iren. 1, 13, 3 [Harv. I 119, 10]).—The body as seat of mortal life εἶναι ἐν σώματι be in the body = alive, subject to mortal ills (TestAbr A 9 p. 87, 3 [Stone p. 22]; Poryphr., Abst. 1, 38) Hb 13:3. ἐνδημεῖν ἐν τῷ σώματι 2 Cor 5:6 (s. ἐνδημέω). ἐκδημῆσαι ἐκ τοῦ σώματος vs. 8 (s. ἐκδημέω). διὰ τοῦ σώματος during the time of one’s mortal life (cp. Lucian, Menipp. 11, end, Catapl. 23) vs. 10 (s. κομίζω 3, but s. also below in this section). Paul does not know whether, in a moment of religious ecstasy, he was ἐν σώματι or ἐκτὸς (χωρὶς) τοῦ σώματος 12:2f (of Epimenides [A2: Vorsokrat.⁵ I p. 29] it was said ὡς ἐξίοι ἡ ψυχὴ ὁπόσον ἤθελε καιρὸν καὶ πάλιν εἰσῄει ἐν τῷ σώματι; Clearchus, Fgm. 7: καθάπερ ὁ Κλέαρχος ἐν τοῖς περὶ ὕπνου φησίν, περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς ἄρα χωρίζεται τοῦ σώματος καὶ ὡς εἴσεισιν εἰς τὸ σῶμα καὶ ὡς χρῆται αὐτῷ οἷον καταγωγίῳ [a resting-place]. In Fgm. 8 Clearchus tells about Cleonymus the Athenian, who seemed to be dead, but awakened after 3 days and thereupon reported everything that he had seen and heard ἐπειδὴ χωρὶς ἦν τοῦ σώματος. His soul is said finally to have arrived εἴς τινα χῶρον ἱερὸν τῆς Ἑστίας; Maximus Tyr. 38, 3a–f Ἀριστέας ἔφασκεν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῷ καταλιποῦσαν τὸ σῶμα in order to wander through the universe. He finds faith everywhere. Similarly 10, 2f. See also the story of Hermotimus in Apollon. Paradox. 3 as well as Lucian, Musc. Enc. [The Fly] 7.—On the two kinds of transcendent vision [with or without the body] s. Proclus, In Pla. Rem Publ. II p. 121, 26ff Kroll: οἱ μὲν μετὰ τοῦ σώματος τῶν τοιούτων [like Ἐμπεδότιμος] ἵστορες [=eyewitnesses], οἱ δὲ ἄνευ σώματος [like Κλεώνυμος]. καὶ πλήρεις αἱ παραδόσεις τούτων.). ἀπὼν τῷ σώματι (παρὼν δὲ τῷ πνεύματι) 1 Cor 5:3. ἡ παρουσία τοῦ σώματος 2 Cor 10:10 (παρουσία 1). The body is the instrument of human experience and suffering 4:10ab; Gal 6:17 (allusion AcPlCor 2, 35); Phil 1:20; the body is the organ of a person’s activity: δοξάσατε τὸν θεὸν ἐν τῷ σώματι ὑμῶν glorify God through your body, i.e. by leading an upright life 1 Cor 6:20; cp. Ro 12:1. This may be the place (s. above in this section) for διὰ τοῦ σώματος 2 Cor 5:10 which, in that case, would be taken in an instrumental sense with or through the body (cp. Pla., Phd. 65a; Ps.-Pla., Axioch. 13, 371c; Aelian, NA 5, 26 τὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος πραττόμενα). In some of the last-named passages (such as Ro 12:1; Phil 1:20; also Eph 5:28 w. parallel in Plut., Mor. 142e: s. HAlmqvist, Plut. u. d. NT ’46, 116f) the body is almost synonymous w. the whole personality (as Aeschin., Or. 2, 58; X., An. 1, 9, 12 τὰ ἑαυτῶν σώματα=themselves. Appian, Syr. 41 §218 παρεδίδου τὸ σῶμα τοῖς ἐθέλουσιν ἀπαγαγεῖν=[Epaminondas] gave himself up to those who wished to take him away, Mithr. 27 §107 ἐς τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ=against his person, Bell. Civ. 2, 106 §442 Caesar’s person [σῶμα] is ἱερὸς καὶ ἄσυλος=sacred and inviolable; 3, 39 §157 ἔργον … σῶμα=course of action … person; Mitt-Wilck. I/2, 55, 7 [III B.C.] ἑκάστου σώματος=for every person. See Wilcken’s note).—Because it is subject to sin and death, man’s mortal body as τὸ σῶμα τῆς σαρκός (σάρξ 2cα) Col 2:11 is a σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας Ro 6:6 or τοῦ θανάτου 7:24; cp. 8:11. In fact, σῶμα can actually take the place of σάρξ 8:13 (cp. Herm. Wr. 4, 6b ἐὰν μὴ πρῶτον τὸ σῶμα μισήσῃς, σεαυτὸν φιλῆσαι οὐ δύνασαι; 11, 21a.—Cp. Hippol., Ref. 5, 19, 6). As a σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως lowly body it stands in contrast to the σῶμα τῆς δόξης glorious body of the heavenly beings Phil 3:21. In another pass. σῶμα ψυχικόν of mortals is opposed to the σῶμα πνευματικόν after the resurrection 1 Cor 15:44abc.—Christ’s earthly body, which was subject to death (Orig., C. Cels. 2, 9, 13) Ro 7:4; Hb 10:5 (Ps 39:7 v.l.), 10; 1 Pt 2:24; AcPlCor 2:16f. τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὰ ὀστᾶ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ 2:32. τὸ σῶμα τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ Col 1:22. Esp. in the language of the Eucharist (opp. αἷμα) Mt 26:26; Mk 14:22; Lk 22:19; 1 Cor 10:16 (GBornkamm, NTS 2, ’56, 202–6); 11:24, 27, 29. S. the lit. s.v. ἀγάπη 2 and εὐχαριστία 3, also JBonsirven, Biblica 29, ’48, 205–19.—ἓν σῶμα a single body 1 Cor 6:16 (cp. Jos., Ant. 7, 66 Δαυίδης τήν τε ἄνω πόλιν κ. τὴν ἄκραν συνάψας ἐποίησεν ἕν σῶμα; Artem. 3, 66 p. 196, 9; RKempthorne, NTS 14. ’67/68, 568–74).

② pl. σώματα slaves (Herodas 2, 87 δοῦλα σώματα; Polyb. et al.; oft. Vett. Val.; ins, pap; Gen 36:6; Tob 10:10; Bel 32; 2 Macc 8:11; Jos., Ant. 14, 321; cp. our colloq. ‘get some bodies for the job’) Rv 18:13 (cp. Ezk 27:13; the abs. usage rejected by Atticists, s. Phryn. 378 Lob.).

③ plant and seed structure, body. In order to gain an answer to his own question in 1 Cor 15:35 ποίῳ σώματι ἔρχονται; (i.e. the dead after the resurrection), Paul speaks of bodies of plants (which are different in kind fr. the ‘body’ of the seed which is planted.—Maximus Tyr. 40, 60e makes a distinction betw. the σώματα of the plants, which grow old and pass away, and their σπέρματα, which endure.—σώματα of plants also in Apollon. Paradox. 7 [after Aristot.]) vs. 37f, and of σώματα ἐπουράνια of the heavenly bodies vs. 40 (cp. Ps.-Aristot., De Mundo 2, 2 the stars as σώματα θεῖα; Maximus Tyr. 21, 8b οὐρανὸς κ. τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ σώματα, acc. to 11, 12a οἱ ἀστέρες; 40, 4h; Sallust. 9 p. 18, 5).

④ substantive reality, the thing itself, the reality in imagery of a body that casts a shadow, in contrast to σκιά (q.v. 3) Col 2:17.

⑤ a unified group of people, body fig. ext. of 1, of the Christian community or church (cp. Cyr. Ins. 58, ‘body of the Hellenes’; Polyaenus, Exc. 18, 4 of the phalanx; Libanius, Or. 1 p. 176, 25 F. τὸ τῆς πόλεως ς.; Plut., Philop. 360 [8, 2]), esp. as the body of Christ, which he fills or enlivens as its Spirit (in this case the head belongs with the body, as Appian, Bell. Civ. 3, 26 §101, where a severed head is differentiated from τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα=the rest of the body), or crowns as its Head (Hdt. 7, 140; Quint. Smyrn. 11, 58; SIG 1169, 3; 15 κεφαλή w. σῶμα as someth. equally independent; Orig., C. Cels. 6, 79, 27): οἱ πολλοὶ ἓν σῶμά ἐσμεν ἐν Χριστῷ Ro 12:5. Cp. 1 Cor 10:17; 12:13, 27; Eph (s. Schlier s.v. ἐκκλησία 3c) 1:23; 2:16; 4:12, 16; 5:23, 30; Col 1:18, 24; 2:19; 3:15; ISm 1:2; Hs 9, 17, 5; 9, 18, 3f. ἓν σῶμα καὶ ἓν πνεῦμα Eph 4:4; cp. Hs 9, 13, 5; 7 (Iambl., Vi. Pyth. 30, 167: all as ἓν σῶμα κ. μία ψυχή; also Just., D. 42, 3) διέλκομεν τὰ μέλη τοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ στασιάζομεν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἴδιον 1 Cl 46:7.—T Schmidt, Der Leib Christi (σῶμα Χριστοῦ) 1919; EKäsemann, Leib u. Leib Christi ’33 (for a critique s. SHanson, Unity of the Church in the NT ’46, 113–16); ÉMersch, Le Corps mystique du Christ² ’36; AWikenhauser, D. Kirche als d. myst. Leib Christi, nach dem Ap. Pls² ’40; EPercy, D. Leib Christi in d. paulin. Homologumena u. Antilegomena ’42; RHirzel, Die Person: SBMünAk 1914 H. 10 p. 6–28 (semantic history of σῶμα); WKnox, Parallels to the NT use of σῶμα: JTS 39, ’38, 243–46; FDillistone, How Is the Church Christ’s Body?: Theology Today 2, ’45/46, 56–68; WGoossens, L’Église corps de Christ d’après St. Paul² ’49; CCraig, Soma Christou: The Joy of Study ’51, 73–85; JRobinson, The Body: A Study in Pauline Theol. ’52; RBultmann, Theol. of the NT, tr. KGrobel ’51, 192–203; HClavier, CHDodd Festschr. ’56, 342–62; CColpe, Zur Leib-Christi Vorstellung im Eph, ’60, 172–87; KGrobel, Bultmann Festschr. ’54, 52–59; HHegermann, TLZ 85, ’60, 839–42; ESchweizer, ibid. 86, ’61, 161–74; 241–56; JMeuzelaar, D. Leib des Messias, ’61; MDahl, The Resurrection of the Body, ’62; RJewett, Paul’s Anthropological Terms, ’71, 201–304; JZiegler, NovT 25, ’83, 133–45 (LXX); JDunn: JSNT Suppl. 100, ’94, 163–81 (Col.).—B. 198. New Docs 4, 38f. DELG. M-M. TW. Sv.

   1) The Knowledge of Ourselves

   We come therefore now to that knowledge whereunto the ancient oracle directeth us, which is the knowledge of ourselves; which deserveth the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth us more nearly. This knowledge, as it is the end and term of natural philosophy in the intention of man, so notwithstanding it is but a portion of natural philosophy in the continent of nature.... [W]e proceed to human philosophy or Humanity, which hath two parts: the one considereth man segregate, or distributively; the other congregate, or in society. So as Human philosophy is either Simple and Particular, or Conjugate and Civil. Humanity Particular consisteth of the same parts whereof man consisteth; that is, of knowledges which respect the Body, and of knowledges that respect the Mind... how the one discloseth the other and how the one worketh upon the other... [:] the one is honored with the inquiry of Aristotle, and the other of Hippocrates. (Bacon, 1878, pp. 236-237)

   2) As a Science, Psychology Is Distinct

   The claims of Psychology to rank as a distinct science are... not smaller but greater than those of any other science. If its phenomena are contemplated objectively, merely as nervo-muscular adjustments by which the higher organisms from moment to moment adapt their actions to environing co-existences and sequences, its degree of specialty, even then, entitles it to a separate place. The moment the element of feeling, or consciousness, is used to interpret nervo-muscular adjustments as thus exhibited in the living beings around, objective Psychology acquires an additional, and quite exceptional, distinction. (Spencer, 1896, p. 141)

   3) Psychology Can Never Be an Exact Natural Science

   Kant once declared that psychology was incapable of ever raising itself to the rank of an exact natural science. The reasons that he gives... have often been repeated in later times. In the first place, Kant says, psychology cannot become an exact science because mathematics is inapplicable to the phenomena of the internal sense; the pure internal perception, in which mental phenomena must be constructed,-time,-has but one dimension. In the second place, however, it cannot even become an experimental science, because in it the manifold of internal observation cannot be arbitrarily varied,-still less, another thinking subject be submitted to one's experiments, comformably to the end in view; moreover, the very fact of observation means alteration of the observed object. (Wundt, 1904, p. 6)

   4) How a " Mathematical" Psychology May Be Realized in Practice

   It is [Gustav] Fechner's service to have found and followed the true way; to have shown us how a "mathematical psychology" may, within certain limits, be realized in practice.... He was the first to show how Herbart's idea of an "exact psychology" might be turned to practical account. (Wundt, 1904, pp. 6-7)

   5) The Rights of Psychology as Science

   "Mind," "intellect," "reason," "understanding," etc. are concepts... that existed before the advent of any scientific psychology. The fact that the naive consciousness always and everywhere points to internal experience as a special source of knowledge, may, therefore, be accepted for the moment as sufficient testimony to the rights of psychology as science.... "Mind," will accordingly be the subject, to which we attribute all the separate facts of internal observation as predicates. The subject itself is determined p. 17) wholly and exclusively by its predicates. (Wundt, 1904,

   6) The Study of Animal Psychology

   The study of animal psychology may be approached from two different points of view. We may set out from the notion of a kind of comparative physiology of mind, a universal history of the development of mental life in the organic world. Or we may make human psychology the principal object of investigation. Then, the expressions of mental life in animals will be taken into account only so far as they throw light upon the evolution of consciousness in man.... Human psychology... may confine itself altogether to man, and generally has done so to far too great an extent. There are plenty of psychological text-books from which you would hardly gather that there was any other conscious life than the human. (Wundt, 1907, pp. 340-341)

   7) The Behaviorist's Formulation

   The Behaviorist began his own formulation of the problem of psychology by sweeping aside all medieval conceptions. He dropped from his scientific vocabulary all subjective terms such as sensation, perception, image, desire, purpose, and even thinking and emotion as they were subjectively defined. (Watson, 1930, pp. 5-6)

   8) Man Is a Microcosm

   According to the medieval classification of the sciences, psychology is merely a chapter of special physics, although the most important chapter; for man is a microcosm; he is the central figure of the universe. (deWulf, 1956, p. 125)

   9) Brief Overview of Psychology's History

   At the beginning of this century the prevailing thesis in psychology was Associationism.... Behavior proceeded by the stream of associations: each association produced its successors, and acquired new attachments with the sensations arriving from the environment.

   In the first decade of the century a reaction developed to this doctrine through the work of the Wurzburg school. Rejecting the notion of a completely self-determining stream of associations, it introduced the task ( Aufgabe) as a necessary factor in describing the process of thinking. The task gave direction to thought. A noteworthy innovation of the Wurzburg school was the use of systematic introspection to shed light on the thinking process and the contents of consciousness. The result was a blend of mechanics and phenomenalism, which gave rise in turn to two divergent antitheses, Behaviorism and the Gestalt movement. The behavioristic reaction insisted that introspection was a highly unstable, subjective procedure.... Behaviorism reformulated the task of psychology as one of explaining the response of organisms as a function of the stimuli impinging upon them and measuring both objectively. However, Behaviorism accepted, and indeed reinforced, the mechanistic assumption that the connections between stimulus and response were formed and maintained as simple, determinate functions of the environment.

   The Gestalt reaction took an opposite turn. It rejected the mechanistic nature of the associationist doctrine but maintained the value of phenomenal observation. In many ways it continued the Wurzburg school's insistence that thinking was more than association-thinking has direction given to it by the task or by the set of the subject. Gestalt psychology elaborated this doctrine in genuinely new ways in terms of holistic principles of organization.

   Today psychology lives in a state of relatively stable tension between the poles of Behaviorism and Gestalt psychology.... (Newell & Simon, 1963, pp. 279-280)

    10) Psychological Research Is Not Building toward Systematic Clarity

   As I examine the fate of our oppositions, looking at those already in existence as guide to how they fare and shape the course of science, it seems to me that clarity is never achieved. Matters simply become muddier and muddier as we go down through time. Thus, far from providing the rungs of a ladder by which psychology gradually climbs to clarity, this form of conceptual structure leads rather to an ever increasing pile of issues, which we weary of or become diverted from, but never really settle. (Newell, 1973b, pp. 288-289)

    11) Psychology as a Scientific Discipline

   The subject matter of psychology is as old as reflection. Its broad practical aims are as dated as human societies. Human beings, in any period, have not been indifferent to the validity of their knowledge, unconcerned with the causes of their behavior or that of their prey and predators. Our distant ancestors, no less than we, wrestled with the problems of social organization, child rearing, competition, authority, individual differences, personal safety. Solving these problems required insights-no matter how untutored-into the psychological dimensions of life. Thus, if we are to follow the convention of treating psychology as a young discipline, we must have in mind something other than its subject matter. We must mean that it is young in the sense that physics was young at the time of Archimedes or in the sense that geometry was "founded" by Euclid and "fathered" by Thales. Sailing vessels were launched long before Archimedes discovered the laws of bouyancy [ sic], and pillars of identical circumference were constructed before anyone knew that C IID. We do not consider the ship builders and stone cutters of antiquity physicists and geometers. Nor were the ancient cave dwellers psychologists merely because they rewarded the good conduct of their children. The archives of folk wisdom contain a remarkable collection of achievements, but craft-no matter how perfected-is not science, nor is a litany of successful accidents a discipline. If psychology is young, it is young as a scientific discipline but it is far from clear that psychology has attained this status. (Robinson, 1986, p. 12)

mūnus (old orthogr. moenus;

moenera militiaï,

Lucr. 1, 29), ĕris, n. [root mu-; cf.: moenia, munis, munia, etc.], a service, office, post, employment, function, duty (class.; syn.: officium, ministerium, honos).

Lit.: munus significat officium, cum dicitur quis munere fungi. Item donum quod officii causā datur, Paul. ex Fest. p. 140 Müll. (cf. infra):

munus curare,

to discharge an office, Plaut. Truc. 2, 4, 76:

octo munus hominum fungi,

id. Men. 1, 4, 5:

administrare,

Ter. Ad. 5, 1, 2:

munus atque officium,

Cic. Font. 7, 15:

rei publicae,

a public office, id. de Or. 1, 45, 199:

belli,

Liv. 24, 35:

de jure respondendi sustinere,

Cic. Brut. 30, 113:

rei publicae explere,

id. Prov. Cons. 14, 35:

vigiliarum obire,

to perform, Liv. 3, 6:

officii,

the performance of a duty, Cic. Sen. 11, 35:

tuum est hoc munus, tuae partes: a te hoc civitas exspectat,

duty, office, obligation, id. Fam. 11, 5, 3:

principum est resistere levitati multitudinis,

id. Mil. 8, 22:

vitae,

id. Sen. 11, 35:

senectutis,

id. Leg. 1, 3, 10.—

Esp., = onus, a duty, burden, tribute:

cum hoc munus imponebatur tam grave civitati,

Cic. Verr. 2, 5, 20, § 51:

id quoque munus leve atque commune Mamertinis remisisti,

id. ib. 2, 5, 21, §

52: dum ne quis eorum munere vacaret,

Liv. 25, 7, 4:

non enim detractionem eam munerum militiae, sed apertam defectionem esse,

id. 27, 9, 9.—

Transf.

A work:

majorum vigiliarum munus, Cic. Par. prooem.: solitudinis,

a work, book, written in solitude, id. Off. 3, 1, 4.—

A service, favor: huc ire licet atque illuc munere ditium dominorum, Sall. Orat. Licin.; Cic. Fam. 10, 11, 1.—

In partic., the last service, office to the dead, i. e. burial: pro hominis dignitate amplo munere extulit, Nep. Eum. 4, 4 (dub.;

al. funere): suprema,

Verg. A. 11, 25:

supremum mortis,

Cat. 101, 3:

debita,

Val. Fl. 3, 313:

fungi inani Munere,

Verg. A. 6, 885:

cineri haec mittite nostro Munera,

id. ib. 4, 624.—

A present, gift (syn.:

donum, praemium): bonum datum deorum concessu atque munere,

Cic. Univ. 14:

mittere alicui,

id. Verr. 2, 4, 27, § 62:

mittere aliquid alicui munere,

to send one something as a present, Plin. 37, 5, 19, § 74 (al. muneri):

quasi totam regionem muneri accepissent,

had received as a present, Tac. A. 14, 31:

aliquem munere donare,

to present one with a gift, Verg. A. 5, 282:

dare muneri aliquid alicui,

to give one something as a present, Nep. Thras. 4, 2:

munera Liberi,

i. e. wine, Hor. C. 4, 15, 26:

terrae,

id. ib. 2, 14, 10:

Cereris,

bread, Ov. M. 10, 74; cf.:

gratae post munus aristae,

Juv. 14, 183:

quem munere palpat Carus,

i. e. a bribe, id. 1, 35.—

In partic.

A public show, spectacle, entertainment, exhibition, esp. a show of gladiators, which was given to the people by the magistrates, and generally by the ædiles, as an expression of gratitude for the honorable office to which they had been elected (cf.:

ludus, spectaculum): erat munus Scipionis, dignum et eo ipso et illo Q. Metello, cui dabatur,

Cic. Sest. 58, 124:

munus magnificum dare,

id. Q. Fr. 3, 8, 6:

praebere,

id. Sull. 19, 54:

functus est aedilicio maximo munere,

i. e. gave a splendid exhibition, id. Off. 2, 16, 55:

edere,

Suet. Tit. 7:

venationes, quae vocantur munera,

Lact. 6, 20:

munera nunc edunt,

Juv. 3, 36; 4, 18.—

A public building for the use of the people, erected at the expense of an individual:

Pompeii munera,

the theatre, Vell. 2, 130, 1:

aut ubi muneribus nati sua munera mater Addidit (i. e. theatro Marcelli porticum Octaviam),

Ov. A. A. 1, 69.—

Transf., of the structure of the universe:

effector vel moderator tanti operis et muneris,

Cic. Tusc. 1, 28, 70.